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ABSTRACT 
  
Board of directors in corporate governance is conceptualized as the perceived ability of a firm to 
constrain and direct corporate power so that it efficiently creates economic value and equitably 
distributes economic wealth. Accordingly, this study examines the relationship between the level of 
compliance with the principles on corporate governance related to the board of directors and 
corporate performance of listed firms in Sri Lanka using secondary data related to 133 listed 
companies from 2009 to 2016. This study constructed Board Index related to dimensions (principles): 
Chairmanship, Nomination Committee, Audit Committee, Remuneration Committee, and Re-election of 
directors, Company Secretary, Role of the Board, Board Meetings and Board Independence. This 
study employs panel regression model to examine the relationship between the Board Index (BI) and 
their relationship with corporate performance and performed with Hausman test for random and fixed 
effects. The findings indicated that the compliance with these principles are positively related to the 
financial performance and negatively related with market performance. Thus, this study provides 
empirical support for the agency perspective in the context of compliance requirements of board of 
directors leading to higher corporate performance. Insights of this research are offered to listed firms 
by the compliance of corporate governance principles have the potential to improve company 
performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Board of directors performs an imperative 
role in the governance structure of large 
organizations (Fama & Jenson 1983). The 
two main functions of the board are decision 
management and decision control according 
to the Agency theory. (Fama & Jenson 
1983). The board of directors‟ acts as the 
formal association between the shareholders 
of the firm and the managers delegated with 
running the organization (Monks & Minow 
1996). Hence, Fama and Jenson (1983) 
quoted board as “the apex of the firm‟s 
decision control system”, which Dalton et 
al. (1996) highlight that the board plays a 
key role in monitoring and controlling 
managers. Tricker (2015) elucidated four 
main roles of the board including 
discharging accountability, strategy 
formulation, supervising executive activities 
and policy making.  
 
The corporate governance codes could be 
considered as implicit portrayals of the 
insights from the agency theory, which has 
encouraged firms to strengthen the 
monitoring capacity of their boards. 
Cadbury, OECD (1999) defined corporate 
governance as “the system by which 
business corporations are directed and 
controlled” and the Financial Reporting 
Council (2016, p.1) suggests “Boards of 
directors are responsible for the governance 
of their companies”.  Accordingly, Cadbury 
Code obliquely   portrayal on the 
discernments from Agency Theory has 
stimulated firms to fortify monitoring 
capacity of boards.  This is to be 
accomplished by establishing CEO-Chair 
duality and by encouraging independence of 
the board and its key monitoring 
committees among other recommendations 
(Cadbury 1992).  
 
    
Hence, theoretically, greater compliance 
with board-related corporate governance 
requirements should be accompanied with 
reduced agency problems, and hence greater 
operating performance and firm value 
(Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach 2010, 
Renders, Gaeremynck, & Sercu 2010). It is 
noted that studies examining the 
governance–performance link based on 
individual governance mechanisms have 
found mixed results (Vafeas & Theodorou 
1998, Weir et al. 2002, Agrawal & Knoeber 
1996, Bhagat & Black 1999).  
 
There have been numerous studies on 
Corporate Governance related to role of 
board of    directors but Carvor (2010) 
argues that universally applicability of the 
findings and  conclusions of those studies is 
debatable owing to various contextual 
causes concerning to research settings 
political stability, cultural backgrounds and 
institutional constraints. Specifically, 
developing countries issues related to board 
of directors is different from developed 
economies due to different contextual 
settings. Van et al. (2012) found that no 
direct relationship between board of 
directors and performance in Asian firms. 
Further they found that board attributes that 
are held to typify good governance 
practices are not exhibited in Asian firms. 
 
Further, in the Sri Lankan context, 
corporate governance principles had been 
increasingly pronounced in the recent past 
and the revised and expanded code of best 
practice on corporate governance was 
issued in 2017. Despite significant efforts 
to establish a sound regulatory framework 
for corporate governance in Sri Lanka, 
studies on corporate governance practices 
at the firm level and their effects on firm 
performance is not sufficient with recent 
data. Accordingly, based on the above 
discussion, the main research objective in 
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this study is to examine the relationship 
between the level of compliance with 
corporate governance principles related to 
board of directors and corporate 
performance of the listed companies in Sri 
Lanka. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. The next 
section reviews relevant literature and 
formulate hypothesis; section 3 describes 
the data and research method deployed in 
addressing the aforementioned research 
issue. Section 4 discusses the analysis of the 
study, and finally the paper ends with 
discussion and conclusion. 
 
2. BACKGROUND/LITERATURE 
SURVEY 
 
This section examines the extant literature 
related to the board of directors and 
performance and the relationship between 
different board dimensions and 
performance and the hypothesis developed 
in accordance with the empirical literature.  
 
2.1 Board Independence and Firm 
Performance 
 
Board independence is represented by non-
executive directors in the board. The primary 
responsibility for board oversight reposes 
with the independent non-executive directors 
(Fama & Jenson 1983). There are two 
conflicting theoretical groundworks used to 
explain this problem and its subsequent 
impact on firm performance, i.e., the agency 
theory (Fama 1980 Fama & Jensen 1983, 
Jensen & Meckling 1976) and the 
stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman & 
Donaldson 1997, Donaldson 1990a, 1990b, 
Donaldson & Davis 1991). Agency theorists 
argue that there is an inescapable conflict 
between parties, such as principals and 
agents. The independence of directors may 
enable boards to perform their oversight 
functions more effectively because such 
boards are considered to be independent 
(Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). 
Consequently, agency theory proposes a 
positive relationship between board 
independence and firm performance (Boyd, 
1995). On the other hand, the stewardship 
theory holds an optimistic view of human 
(managerial) behaviour, and dispute that 
agents are not essentially motivated by 
individual goals and that rather they are 
intrinsically reliable and not predisposed to 
embezzle corporate resources and are 
motivated to work in the interest of their 
principals and other stakeholders (Davis et 
al. 1997, Donaldson 1990a, 1990b, 
Donaldson & Davis 1991). Furthermore, this 
theory recommends that the optimal 
stewardship role can only be exercised when 
the board has the ultimate power and 
authority. Therefore, this theory suggests an 
inverse relationship between board 
independence and performance. 
As in the case of above theoretical 
explanations, the empirical evidence related 
to the relationship between Board 
Independence and performance is also 
mixed. The results of the board 
independence and performance is 
summarized in the Table 1 below.  
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Table 1: Literature related to the board independence 
Author Article Country Relationship 
Pearce & Zahra, 
(1991) 
The relative power of CEOs and boards 
of directors: Associations with corporate 
performance 
USA Positive 
Ezzamel & Watson, 
(1993) 
Organizational Form, Ownership 
Structure and Corporate Performance: A 
Contextual Empirical Analysis of UK 
Companies 
UK Positive 
Hossain, Prevost & 
Roa, (2001) 
Corporate Governance in New Zealand: 
The effect of the 1993 Companies Act on 
the relation between board composition 
and firm performance 
New 
Zealand 
Positive 
Choi, Park & Yoo, 
(2007) 
The value of outside directors: Evidence 
from corporate governance reform in 
Korea 
Korea Positive 
Grace, Ireland & 
Dunstan(1995) 
Board composition, non-executive 
directors' characteristics and corporate 
financial performance 
Australia Negative 
Baysinger & 
Butler(1985) 
Corporate governance and the board of 
directors: Performance effects of changes 
in board composition 
USA Negative 
Bhagat & Black, 
(2002) 
The non-correlation between board 
independence and long-term firm 
performance 
USA Negative 
Chaganti, Mahajan 
& Sharma(1985); 
Corporate board size, composition and 
corporate failures in retailing industry 
USA Negative 
Hermalin & 
Weisbach, (2010) 
The Role of Boards of Directors in 
Corporate Governance: A Conceptual 
Framework and Survey. 
USA Negative 
Rechner & 
Dalton(1986) 
Board composition and shareholder 
wealth: An empirical assessment 
USA Negative 
Yermack(1996) Higher market valuation of companies 
with a small board of directors 
USA Negative 
Rashid, De Zoysa, 
Lodh & Rudkin, 
(2010) 
Board composition and firm 
performance: Evidence from Bangladesh 
Bangladesh Negative 
Source: Constructed by the Authors based on the literature
Accordingly, based on the above theoretical 
and empirical evidence the first hypothesis 
of this study could be established and stated 
as follows: 
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between 
board independence and performance 
2.2 Board Chairman and Performance 
The empirical evidence related to the 
principles related to the board chairmanship 
and performance is mainly based on CEO 
duality.  This means one person holds both 
chairman and CEO positions in a firm  
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(Boyd 1995). According to the Agency 
theory, separating two positions are 
desirable in order to reduce the potential 
conflicts of interest, but Stewardship theory 
suggests that integrating the two positions 
advocates that unequivocal authority and 
unique leadership power over the 
authorities. 
As in the case of independence and firm 
performance, the empirical evidence related 
to the relationship between board 
independence and performance is also 
mixed. The results of the board 
independence and performance are 
summarized in the Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Literature related the Chairman and Performance 
Author Article Country Relationship 
Daily & Dalton 
(1992) 
The relationship between governance 
structure and corporate performance in 
entrepreneurial firm 
USA No relationship 
Brickley et al. 
(1997) 
Leadership structure: Separating the 
CEO and chairman of the board 
USA No relationship 
Sanda et al. 
(2003)) 
Corporate governance mechanisms and 
firm financial performance in Nigeria 
Nigeria Positive 
Donaldson and 
David (1995) 
Boards and company performance – 
Research challenges the conventional 
wisdom 
USA Negative 
Azeez (2015) Corporate governance and firm 
performance: evidence from Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka Negative 
Source: Constructed by the authors based on extant literature 
 
Accordingly, based on the above 
discussion, the second hypothesis of this 
study could be established and indicated as 
follows: 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between 
corporate governance principles related to 
board chairmanship and firm performance 
 
Board Committees and Performance 
The recommendations of Cadbury (1992) 
suggest that the board‟s monitoring role 
can further be improved by establishing 
oversight board committees which enable 
the directors‟ duties to be meticulously. 
The empirical evidence related to the 
relationship between board committees and 
performance is also observed to be mixed. 
The results of the board committees and 
performance are summarized in the Table 3 
below. 
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Table 3: Literature related to Board Committees and Performance 
Author Article Country Relationship 
Dionne and 
Triki (2005) 
Risk management and corporate governance: 
The importance of independence and financial 
knowledge for the board and the audit 
committee 
USA Positive 
Hilman et al. 
(2008) 
Directors‟ multiple role identities, identification 
and board monitoring and resource provision 
UK Positive 
Adjoud et.al. 
(2007) 
The effect of board‟s quality on performance: A 
study of Canadian firms.  
Canada Positive 
Klein (1998) Firm performance and board committee 
structure 
USA No 
relationship 
Vafeas and 
Theodorou 
(1998)  
The relationship between board structure and 
firm performance in the UK 
UK No 
relationship 
 
Dulewicz and 
Herbert (2004) 
Does the composition and practice of boards of 
directors bear any relationship to the 
performance of their companies 
UK No 
relationship 
 
Mak and 
Kusnadi (2005) 
Size really matters: Further evidence on the 
negative relationship between board size and 
firm value. 
Singapore No 
relationship 
Source: Constructed by the authors based on extant literature 
Based on the above discussion, the third 
hypothesis of this study could be indicated 
as follows: 
 
H3: There is a positive relationship between 
the presence of independent committees of 
the board and performance. 
 
2.3 Board Meeting Frequency and 
Performance 
According to the Resource Dependency 
theory, active board involvement is 
important to enhance performance 
(Hillmanet.al 2009). Jackling and Johl 
(2009) suggest that board meeting 
frequency is a main parameter to measure 
board activity. The board meeting is a 
medium set up for deliberations on key 
issues and matters amongst board members 
in order to make certain important 
decisions for the progress and growth of 
any organization. Board of directors hold 
more meetings results in increasing their 
capacity to advise, control and ensure 
discipline in an organization, so as to 
improve corporate firm performance (Ntim 
& Osei 2011). Thus, this relationship is 
also supported by the Agency theory. 
Francis et al. (2012b) and Ntim and Osei 
(2011) suggest that when the board meets 
more frequently, this will increase their 
ability to effectively monitor, advice, 
scrutinize and create an atmosphere of 
discipline. Based on these arguments, the 
fourth hypothesis could be established and 
depicted as follows: 
 
H4: There is a positive relationship between 
the board meeting frequency and firm 
performance. 
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2.4 Overall Board Index and 
Performance 
Observation of extant literature indicates 
that there is a limited number of extant 
research that use the overall board related 
principles of corporate governance (i.e., in 
terms of a board index) in the world. 
Sahakuat and Grzegroz (2018) has found 
strong positive relationship between board 
index and performance. In their study, 13 
dimensions of board governance 
principles are considered including 
principles related to CEO-Chair duality, 
Board Independence, Nomination 
Committee, Remuneration Committee and 
Audit Committee.  
 
In the Sri Lankan context, Dissabandara 
(2010) has constructed Board Index using 
14 dimensions including strategic 
direction, legal and ethical compliance, 
board meetings, board structure, external 
relations and board-staff roles in addition 
to sahakuat A. and Grzegroz T.(2018). 
Dissabandara(2010)study only measure 
the board index and the average 
compliance level of board index was 56. 
 
Based on the above observations, this 
study hypothesizes that: 
 
H5: There is a positive relationship 
between Board Governance Index and 
Performance 
 
3.   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY / 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
This study examines the relationship 
between corporate governance principles 
related to the board and firm performance 
of listed companies in Sri Lanka. Thus, it is 
based on a positivist paradigm and uses a 
deductive reasoning in establishing the 
causes and effects of a thus social 
phenomenon (Hussey & Hussey 1997). The 
reasoning is deductive because the 
hypotheses are derived first, and then the 
related data will be collected later to 
confirm or negate these established 
hypotheses. Bryman and Bell (2007) 
indicate that the deductive approach is 
related to quantitative research that follows 
objectivism, ontological realism and 
epistemological positivism. Gill and 
Johnson (2002) argued that the 
development of a conceptual and theoretical 
structure prior to its testing through 
empirical observation is needed in a 
deductive research method. As a result, 
quantitative data will be used as the 
evidence required for testing the hypotheses 
in this study.  
 
The population for this study consists of 
public listed companies incorporated under 
the Companies Act No. 7 of 2007 and listed 
under the Colombo Stock Exchange 
(www.cse.lk). The Colombo Stock 
Exchange comprises 295 companies 
representing 20 business sectors as at 31
st
 
December 2016. This study would consider 
only the companies listed before 
31/12/2009 and continued till December 
2016.  
 
This study used a stratified sampling 
method to select the sample of companies, 
whereby the population was divided into 
non-overlapping sub-populations based on 
the business sectors of the Colombo Stock 
Exchange. This sampling method is used to 
obtain a representative sample across the 
sectors listed on CSE. CSE classified listed 
companies under 20 sectors. The sample of 
130 listed companies are selected based on 
the sector-wise highest market 
capitalization on thirty first December 2016. 
First, 150 companies were selected based 
on the highest market capitalization. Next 
the companies registered after 2009 has 
excluded from the sample. Second, in order 
to select a representative sample based on 
individual sectors, a minimum of five 
companies were identified from each sector 
which had higher market capitalization in 
the respective sectors. Table 4 depict the 
sample selection and representation of the 
total population. 
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Table 4: Final Sample  
 
Sector No of Companies 
in CSE 
Final 
Sample 
Representation from 
the total population  
Bank finance and Assurance 60 22 36.67 
Beverage Food and Tobacco 21 14 66.67 
Chemicals and 
Pharmaceuticals 
10 5 50  
Construction and 
Engineering 
4 2 50 
Diversified Holdings 19 11 57.89 
Foot wear and textiles 3 0 0 
Closed End 0 0 0 
Health Care 6 5 83.33 
Hotels and Travels 37 15 40.54 
Information and Technology 2 0 0 
Investments 9 5 55.56 
Land and Property 19 7 36.84 
Manufacturing 37 16 43.24 
Motors 6 3 50 
Oil Palms 5 5 100 
Plantations 19 5 26.32 
Power and Energy 8 4 50 
Services 8 3 37.5 
Stores Supplies 4 4 100 
Telecommunication 2 2 100 
Trading 8 5 62.5 
 287 133 46.34 
 
Source: Constructed by the Authors 
 
The data required for the study was secured 
via secondary data. The information with 
regard to governance variables were 
obtained through the corporate governance 
information provided in each annual report, 
which were downloaded from the CSE 
website. Data for the alternative dependent 
variables such as ROA and ROE were 
collected through the financial statements of 
each annual report. Stock market 
information was obtained via the CSE 
website and databases.   
 
The operationalization of the other variables 
is indicated in Table 5 below 
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Table 4: Operationalization of Variables 
Variable* Denotation         Measures  Articles used this variables 
        
Return on 
Equity ROE 
Net Profit after Tax/Book Value of 
Equity  
Adjoud,., Zeghal & Andaleeb, 
(2007).  
      Azeez, (2015) 
      Manawaduge, (2012). 
Tobin‟s Q Tobin‟s Q 
Market Capitalization+(Book value of 
Assets-Book Value of Equity)  Manawaduge,  (2012). 
    Book Value of Equity Drobetz et.al (2004) 
        
Leverage DE Total Liabilities/Total Equity 
Azeez, (2015) Manawaduge,  
(2012) 
Firm Size lnTA Natural Logarithm of Total assets 
Azeez, , (2015) 
Manawaduge, (2012) 
Firm Risk Risk Beta   
Firm 
Growth Growth Sales Growth Drobetz et.al (2004) 
    (Salest – Salest-1)/Salest-1 * 100   
Source: Constructed by the authors based on extant literature 
 
Construction of Overall Board 
Governance Index 
The overall board governance index (BI) 
that captures the overall monitoring capacity 
of the board was developed based on key 
board-compliance requirements that were 
derived on different corporate governance 
codesusing ICASL, OECD and UK codes. 
Accordingly, this board index consists of 
nine main board related dimensions as 
follows: 
 
 Chairman  
 Nomination Committee  
 Audit Committee  
 Remuneration Committee  
 Re-election  
 Company Secretary 
 Role of the Board  
 Board Meetings  
 Board Independence  
 
 
 
Each dimension was scored using a Likert 
scale by measuring 0 to 5 according to the 
level of compliance. When the companies 
are not complied the mark has given as 0. 
They have complied only with comments is 
marked as 1, if company complied in 
disclosed contents with figures is marked as 
5. Principles of Board index are annexed. 
(Appendix 01) 
 
Conceptual Framework of the study 
Based on the extant empirical and theoretical 
literature discussed under Section 2 of this 
study, following conceptual diagram could 
be drawn, which depicts the relationship 
between board governance principles and 
corporate performance.   
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This study employs panel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
Source: Constructed by the authors based on extant literature 
Data Analyses Strategies  
Several diagnostic tests are performed on the 
sample data of this thesis. Following previous 
researches (Alkdai & Hanefah 2012), the 
tests for normality, extreme outliers and 
multicollinearity are carried out. In addition, 
diagnostic tests particularly for the panel 
data, including contemporaneous correlation, 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are 
also performed on the data. 
 
Regression model to examine the relationship 
between the Board Index (BI) and their 
relationship with corporate performance and 
performed with Housman test for random and 
fixed effects. This method of analysing the 
relationship is supported by Madalla et al. 
(2001). The following regression model is 
used to test the hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
In terms of results, the descriptive analysis 
of Board index (BI) in the period of 2009 to 
2016 revealed that the level of compliance 
with the principles pertaining to board of 
directors is only 55% on an overall basis. 
Table 6 also illustrates descriptive statistics 
of board sub-dimensions for the period of 
2009 to 2016, and the compliance level of 
board of directors related to the principles 
pertaining to audit committees, company 
secretary and role of the board is at higher 
levels, but the compliance levels on 
principles of nomination committee, re-
election, board independence is at lower 
levels, which is observed to be less than 
50%.
Corporate Performance 
1. ROE 
2. Tobin‟s Q 
 
Board of Directors Index 
1. Chairman 
2. Nomination Committee  
3. Audit Committee  
4. Remuneration Committee
  
5. Re-election  
6. Company Secretary  
7. Role of the Board  
8. Board Meetings  
9. Board Independence 
 
Control Variables 
1. Log of Total 
Assets 
2. DEBT/EQUITY 
Ratio 
3. Beta 
4. Sales Growth 
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Table 5: Descriptive Analysis 
 
Minimum Mean  Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Nomination Committee(NC) 0 23.01 92.86 0.95 -0.67 
Audit Committee(AC) 0 98.38 100 -7.89 65.8 
Remuneration Committee(RC) 0 64.69 100 0.26 -1.02 
Reelection(RE) 0 18.92 100 1.52 0.69 
Company Secretary(CS) 0 86.49 100 -0.67 -0.65 
Role of the Board(BR) 0 81.08 100 -1.39 0.35 
Board Meetings(BM) 0 69.18 100 -0.7 -0.74 
Board Independence(IND) 0 32.39 100 0.98 -0.19 
Board Index  (BI)  10.58 54.92 94.07 0.3 0 
 
In terms of the correlation results, Table 7 
shows that the Pearson Correlation (0.045, 
p<.0.10)) has a positive and significant 
coefficient for the relationship between BI and 
firm performance as measured by ROE. Thus, 
this result indicate that financial performance 
tends to increase with the increase in the level 
of compliance of board principles as 
measured by BI, as hypothesized under H5. 
However, unexpectedly, it shows a negative 
correlation (-0.131, p<.0.05) with regard to 
Tobin‟s Q, which could be attributed to the 
high market anomalies prevailed in the Sri 
Lankan context at the period of consideration. 
 
Table 7: Correlation Analysis 
Board Index (BI) ROE 
Tobins 
Q 
Correlation Coefficient 0.071
 
-0.131
 
p-value (2-tailed) 0.17 0 
Source: Constructed by the Authors 
 
Table 8 shows the panel regression results with 
the fixed effect model after conducting 
Hausman test for ROE and Tobin’s Q on the 
independent variables. The results derived 
from the regression analysis reveals that the 
Board Index has a significant (p<.10) positive 
relationship with the firm financial 
performance as measured by ROE.  
 
Table 8: Results of Regression 
Independent Variables 
Model 1-with ROE Model 2-Tobins_Q   
Coefficient Std. Error  P>t Coefficient Std. Error  P>t 
BI 0.309 0.18 0.087 -0.001 0.009 0.948 
Growth 0 0 0.141 0 0 0.369 
lnTA  -7.374 3.435 0.032 -0.701 0.097 0 
DE -0.345 3.398 0.919 0.028 0.01 0.007 
Risk 0.662 1.103 0.549 0.144 0.032 0 
Constant  112.417 57.053 0.049 12.578 1.877 0 
Source: Constructed by the Authors 
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Table 9 illustrates the results of regression 
analysis for Return on Equity. The results 
derived from the regression analysis reveals 
that the Board Independence has a 
significant positive relationship with the 
firm performance measured with ROE. 
(β=0.037, ρ<0.005).  Therefore this study 
supports H1. Next Nomination Committee 
and Audit Committee exhibit a significant 
positive relationship with the firm 
performance measured with ROE. 
(β=0.700, 0.068, ρ<0.005) but remuneration 
committee exhibit no relationship with 
ROE. Afterwards board meetings and Firm 
performance exhibit negative relationship 
with ROE. (β=-0.032,ρ<0.005). This will 
not support. 
H3 and supports with Stewardship theory. 
Company Secretary exhibit negative 
significant relationship with ROE. (β=-0.135, 
ρ<0.005). Re-election procedure exhibits 
positive significant relationship with ROE. 
(0.030, ρ<0.1) .but role of board and chairman 
exhibits no relationship with ROE. According 
to the results of regression analysis with 
Tobins_Q the remuneration committee and 
board meetings have significant negative 
relationship but no relationship with other 
variables. 
 
 
Table 9: Results of Regression with sub-indexes 
Variable 
Model 1-with ROE Model 2-Tobins_Q 
Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Prob. 
C 11.058 18.382 0.548 9.404 0.668 0.000 
Board_Independence 0.037 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.811 
Board_Meetings -0.032 0.014 0.027 0.002 0.001 0.018 
Company_Secretary -0.135 0.047 0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.197 
Chairman 0.005 0.023 0.839 0.001 0.001 0.322 
Audit_Committee 0.700 0.187 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.551 
Nomination_Committee 0.068 0.017 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.655 
Remunration_Committee -0.210 0.129 0.104 -0.011 0.005 0.032 
Relection 0.030 0.010 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.043 
Role_Of_The_Board 0.017 0.040 0.672 0.002 0.002 0.338 
Beta 0.006 0.185 0.972 0.107 0.013 0.000 
Debt_Equity -0.944 0.287 0.001 0.031 0.006 0.000 
Sales 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.226 
Lntotal_Assets -2.691 0.488 0.000 -0.473 0.036 0.000 
R-squared 0.815 
  
0.749 
  Adjusted R-squared 0.780 
  
0.702 
  Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
  
0.000 
   Durbin-Watson stat 1.582     1.910     
Source: Constructed by the Authors 
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6.  CONCLUSION / FURTHER WORK 
 
This study has examined the relationship 
between compliance with board governance 
principles (BI) and firm performance of listed 
firms in Sri Lanka.  The BI consists of nine 
main principles including principles on 
chairmanship, nomination committee, audit 
committee, remuneration committee, re-
election of directors, company secretary, role 
of the board, board meetings and board 
independence.  
 
The findings indicated that the average level of 
BI is only 55% in the Sri Lankan listed 
companies and there are considerable 
variations in level of compliance between 
the different companies; which shows 
inadequate board governance compliance 
levels in Sri Lanka. In terms of the relationship 
between board governance compliance and 
level of performance, the correlation and panel 
regression results suggest that BI is positively 
associated with firm financial performance but 
BI is negatively associated with the market 
performance. This paper provides mixed 
evidence on the association between 
compliance of principles related to board of 
directors and firm financial performance for a 
large panel of listed companies in the Sri 
Lankan context, which is also consistent with 
prior studies (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach 
2010, Renders, Gaeremynck, & Sercu 2010).  
This study further suggest compliance with 
board independence, audit committee and 
nomination committee impact on positive 
financial performance whereas board meeting 
and company secretary impact on negative 
financial performance.  
Accordingly, the study provides empirical 
evidence for the assertions made by the 
agency theory. Further, this study is expected 
to have significant policy implications where 
policy makers should consider strengthening 
corporate governance principles related to 
boards, in order to enhance their financial 
performance. This study is methodologically 
significant as the board index has prepared in 
the Sri Lankan context with an archival data 
analysis. 
 
In terms of limitations, this study only 
considered principles related to the board of 
directors and for the period of 2009 to 2016. 
Accordingly, future research could expand the 
scope of corporate governance dimensions as 
well as expand the period considered. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 01-Principles of Board Index 
Chairman 
1. The annual report should identify the 
chairman, the deputy chairman (where 
there is one), the chief executive, the 
senior independent director and the 
chairmen and members of the board 
committees. 
2. The chairman should hold meetings with 
the non-executive directors without the 
executives present. 
3. For the appointment of a chairman, the 
nomination committee should prepare a 
job specification, including an 
assessment of the time commitment 
expected, recognising the need   for 
availability in   the event of   crises.  
4. A chairman‟s   other significant 
commitments should be disclosed to the 
board before appointment and included 
in the annual report.  
5. changes to such commitments should be 
reported to the board as they arise, and 
their impact explained in the next annual 
report.  
6. The chairman should ensure that new 
directors receive a full, formal and 
tailored induction on joining the board 
directors should avail themselves of 
opportunities to meet major 
shareholders. 
7. The chairman should regularly review 
and agree with each director their 
training and development needs.  
 
Nomination Committee 
  
1. Boards should consider assigning a 
sufficient number of non-executive 
board members capable of exercising 
independent judgement to tasks where 
there is a potential for conflict of 
interest.  
2. There should be a nomination 
committee which should lead the 
process for board appointments and 
make recommendations to the board.  
  
3. A majority of members of the 
nomination   committee should be   
independent non-executive   directors.
  
4. The chairman or an independent non-
executive director should chair the 
committee, but the chairman should not 
chair the nomination committee when it 
is dealing with the appointment of a 
successor to the chairmanship.  
5. The nomination committee should make 
available its terms of reference, 
explaining its role and the authority 
delegated to it by the board.  
6. The   nomination committee   should 
evaluate   the   balance of   skills, 
experience, independence and 
knowledge on the board  and,  in  the  
light  of   this  evaluation, prepare   a   
description   of   the   role   and  
capabilities   required   for   a   particular 
appointment.  
7. Non-executive directors should be 
appointed for specified terms subject to 
re-election and to statutory provisions 
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relating to the removal of a director.  
8. Any term  beyond six years for  a non-
executive  director should  be subject to  
particularly rigorous  review, and 
should take into account the need for 
progressive  refreshing of the board.
  
9. A separate  section of  the annual report  
should describe the  work of the  
nomination committee,  including the  
process it has used in relation  to board 
appointments.   
10. This section  should  include  a  
description  of  the  board‟s  policy  on  
diversity,  including gender, any  
measurable objectives  that it  has set  for 
implementing  the policy,  and progress 
on  achieving the  objectives.   
11. The terms and  conditions of appointment 
of non-executive  directors should be 
made available for  inspection  
12. The letter  of appointment should  set out 
the expected  time commitment.   
13. Non-executive  directors should 
undertake  that they will  have sufficient 
time to meet what is expected of them.
  
14. Their other significant commitments 
should be disclosed  to  the  board  before  
appointment,   with  a  broad  indication  
of  the  time involved and the board 
should be informed of subsequent 
changes.  
 
Audit Committee 
  
1. The board should satisfy itself that  at 
least one member of the audit committee 
has recent and relevant financial 
experience  
2. The main role and  responsibilities of the 
audit committee should  be set out in 
written terms of reference     
3. The terms of reference of the audit 
committee, including its role and the 
authority delegated to it by the board, 
should be made available  
4. Where requested by the board, the audit 
committee should provide advice on 
whether the annual report and accounts, 
taken as a whole, is fair, balanced and 
understandable and provides the 
information necessary for shareholders 
to assess the company‟s position and 
performance, business model and 
strategy  
5. The audit committee should review 
arrangements by which staff of the 
company may, in confidence, raise 
concerns about possible improprieties in 
matters of financial reporting or other 
matters.  
6. The audit committee‟s objective should 
be to ensure that arrangements are in 
place for the proportionate and 
independent investigation of such matters 
and for appropriate follow-up act  
7. The audit committee should monitor and 
review the effectiveness of the internal 
audit  activities.  
8. Where there is no internal audit function, 
the audit committee should consider 
annually whether there is a need for an 
internal audit function and make a 
recommendation to the board, and the 
reasons for the absence of such a function 
should be explained in the relevant 
section of the annual report  
9. The audit committee should have primary 
responsibility for making a 
recommendation on the appointment, 
reappointment and removal of the 
external auditors.  
10. If the board does not accept the audit 
committee‟s recommendation, it should 
include in the annual report, and in any 
papers recommending appointment or re-
appointment, a statement  from the audit 
committee explaining the 
recommendation and should set out 
reasons why the board has taken a 
different position.  
11. A separate section of the annual report 
should describe the work of the 
committee in discharging its 
responsibilities.  
12. The significant issues that the committee 
considered in relation to the financial 
statements, and how these issues were 
addressed;  
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13. An explanation of how it has assessed 
the effectiveness of the external audit 
process and the approach taken to the 
appointment or reappointment of the 
external auditor , and information on the 
length of tenure of the current audit firm 
and when a tender was last conducted
  
14. If the external auditor provides non-audit 
services, an explanation of how auditor 
objectivity and independence are 
safeguarded.  
 
Remuneration Committee  
 
1. In designing schemes of performance-
related remuneration for executive 
directors, the remuneration committee 
should follow the provisions in Schedule 
A to this Code.  
2. Schemes should include provisions that 
would enable the company to recover 
sums paid or withhold the payment of any 
sum, and specify the circumstances in 
which it would be appropriate    
3. Where a company releases an executive 
director to serve as a non-executive 
director elsewhere, the remuneration 
report should include a statement as to 
whether or not the director will retain 
such earnings and, if so, what the 
remuneration is.  
4. Levels of remuneration for non-executive 
directors should reflect the time 
commitment and responsibilities of the 
role. Remuneration for non-executive 
directors should not include share options 
or other performance-related elements.
  
5. If, exceptionally, options are granted, 
shareholder approval should be sought in 
advance and any shares acquired by 
exercise of the options should be held 
until at least one year after the non-
executive director leaves the board.  
6. The remuneration committee should 
carefully consider what compensation 
commitments (including pension 
contributions and all other elements) their 
directors „terms of appointment  would 
entail in the event of early termination. 
The aim should be to avoid rewarding 
poor performance.   
7. they should take a robust line on reducing 
compensation to reflect departing 
directors‟ obligations to mitigate loss.
  
8. Notice or contract periods should be set at 
one year or less.  
9. The board should establish a 
remuneration committee of at least three, 
or in the case of smaller companies two, 
independent non-executive directors.
  
10. In addition the company chairman may 
also be a member of, but not chair, the 
committee if he or she was considered 
independent on appointment as chairman.
  
11. The remuneration committee should 
make available its terms of reference, 
explaining its role and the authority 
delegated to it by the board.  
12. Where remuneration consultants are 
appointed, they should be identified in the 
annual report and a statement made as to 
whether they have any other connection 
with the company.  
13. The remuneration committee should have 
delegated responsibility for setting 
remuneration for all executive directors 
and the chairman, including pension 
rights and any  compensation payments.
  
14. The committee should also recommend 
and monitor the level and structure of 
remuneration for senior management.
  
15. The board itself or, where required by the 
Articles of Association, the shareholders 
should determine the remuneration of the 
non-executive directors within the limits 
set in the Articles of Association.   
16. Where permitted by the Articles, the 
board may however delegate this 
responsibility to a committee, which 
might include the chief executive.  
17. Shareholders should be invited 
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specifically to approve all new long-term 
incentive schemes (as defined in the 
Listing Rules23) and significant changes 
to existing schemes, save in the 
circumstances permitted by the Listing 
Rules. 
  
Re-election 
  
1. All other directors  should be subject to 
election  by shareholders at the first 
annual  general meeting  after their 
appointment,  and to  re-election 
thereafter at intervals  of  no more  than  
three  years.    
2. Non-executive  directors  who  have 
served longer  than  nine  years  should   
be  subject  to  annual  re-election.   
3. The   names  of directors  submitted for  
election or  re-election  should be  
accompanied by  sufficient biographical 
details and any other relevant information 
to enable shareholders to take an 
informed decision on their election. 
4. The board should set out to shareholders  
in the papers accompanying a resolution 
to elect a non-executive  director why 
they believe  an individual should be  
elected.   
5. chairman should  confirm to  shareholders 
when proposing  re-election that,  
following  formal performance 
evaluation, the individual‟s performance  
continues to be effective and to 
demonstrate commitment to the role. 
 
Board evaluation - self and group 
  
1. The  board  should  state  in  the  annual  
report how  performance  evaluation  of  
the board, its committees and its 
individual directors has been conducted.
  
2. The  non-executive   directors,  led  by  
the  senior  independent   director,  should  
be responsible for performance evaluation 
of the chairman, taking into account the 
views of executive directors  
 
 
Company Secretary  
 
1. The  board  should  ensure  that  directors,  
especially  non-executive  directors,  have 
access  to independent  professional  
advice at  the  company‟s expense  where  
they judge it necessary to discharge  their 
responsibilities as directors.  
2. All  directors   should  have   access  to  
the   advice  and  services   of  the   
company secretary, who  is  responsible to  
the board  for  ensuring that  board 
procedures  are complied with.  
3. Both the appointment  and removal  of the 
company  secretary should be a matter for 
the board as a whole.  
  
Role of the Board  
 
1. Board members should act on a fully 
informed basis, in good faith, with due 
diligence and care, and in the best interest 
of the company and the shareholders.
  
2. The annual report should include a 
statement of how the board operates, 
including a high level statement of which 
types of decisions are to be taken by the 
board and which are to be delegated to 
management.  
 
Board Meetings 
  
1. It should also set out the number of 
meetings of the board and those 
committees and individual attendance by 
directors.  
2. The board should meet sufficiently 
regularly to discharge its duties effectively. 
  
3. There should be a formal schedule of 
matters specifically reserved for its 
decision.   
 
Board Independence  
 
1. The board should appoint one of the 
independent non-executive directors to be 
the senior independent director to provide 
a sounding board for the chairman and to 
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serve as an intermediary for the other 
directors when necessary.   
2. The senior independent director should be 
available to shareholders if they have 
concerns which contact through the 
normal channels of chairman, chief 
executive or other directors has failed to 
resolve or for which such contact is 
inappropriate.  
3. Led by the senior independent director, 
the non-executive directors should meet 
without the chairman present at least 
annually to appraise the chairman‟s 
performance and on such other occasions 
as are deemed appropriate.  
4. Where directors have concerns which 
cannot be resolved about the running of 
the company or a proposed action, they 
should ensure that their concerns are 
recorded in the board minutes.   
5. On resignation, a non-executive director 
should provide a written statement to the 
chairman, for circulation to the board, if 
they have any such concerns  
6. The   board should identify   in the   
annual report each non-executive director   
it considers to be independent.    
7. The  board  should determine  whether 
the  director is independent  in  character  
and  judgement  and  whether  there  are  
relationships  or circumstances  which  
are  likely to  affect,  or  could  appear  to  
affect,  the  director‟s judgement.  
8. The  board should  state  its  reasons  if  it  
determines that  a  director  is 
independent notwithstanding  the  
existence of  relationships or  
circumstances which may appear relevant 
to its determination, including if the 
director  
9. The board should be able to exercise 
objective independent judgement on 
corporate affairs. 
10. Boards should consider assigning a 
sufficient number of non-executive 
board members capable of exercising 
independent judgement to tasks where 
there is a potential for conflict of 
interest.  
